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(Unclassified) Data for General Vandenberg's Testimony Before Congress

Director of Plans, DCS/O

23 MAY 1951

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Director of Intelligence, DCS/O

AFOOP-2/TP
LtCol Graham/ro/53498

1. Information requested in Comment 1 from the Director of Plans, DCS/O is forwarded herewith.

Question No. 1 - Number of important targets by type and location within range of our medium bombers.

Strategically important targets in Manchuria and China, all of which are within range of United States strategic bombing aircraft are as follows. These do not represent the total number of targets in each system but do include those of sufficient importance to be attacked in the event of war with Communist China.

Type	Number	Location
Electric Power	37	1 North Korea (China) 14 Manchuria 10 North China 10 China Proper

(There are three additional electric power targets, two in Hong Kong, British, and one in Macao, Portuguese, that should also be attacked in the event of occupation by the Communist Chinese)

Transportation, Rail Marshalling Yards	17	14 Manchuria 3 North China
Transportation, Port Approaches (Mining Targets)	5	3 Manchuria 2 North China
Liquid Fuels, Plants	5	Manchuria
Liquid Fuels, Storage Facilities (in addition to the storage at the 5 plants	15	5 Manchuria 10 China

Rail transportation and electric power facilities in China and Manchuria are already overloaded and have practically no cushion. It is estimated that these attacks will reduce the capacity of the Manchurian rail net by 50% with an increase to a total of 75% reduction due to the attack on electric power and the consequent effect on coal production.

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Over 80% of Manchurian power is consumed by industry, with mining alone taking over 65%. It is expected that the attack on the power targets will reduce coal production by up to 90%, iron and steel production 90%, munitions (excluding explosives) 90%, chemicals 70% and textiles 75%.

China's production of liquid fuels is at most 10% of her requirement, and stocks are believed to be short. It is believed that the attack on liquid fuels in conjunction with the attack on transportation will restrict mobility, and therefore the Communist Chinese offensive capability.

In addition to the strategic targets listed above, it is recommended that airlift supply be furnished the estimated 200,000 effectives of the estimated 700,000 total guerrilla force in southern China. The initial requirement is estimated to be 2,000 tons, mainly communications equipment, small arms, and ammunition.

Resupply would be at most 500 tons per day.

Other targets considered to be of lesser strategic importance, and not included in force requirements are:

Munitions, Arsenals	5	
Munitions, Storage Facilities	8	
Iron and Steel Plants	7	
Chemical Plants	8	
Liquid Fuel Storage	17	(Believed currently inactive)
Rail and Highway Bridges	50	
Rail Yards	65	
Port Approaches	17	
Naval Bases and Shipyards	6	(Plus 6 in Hong Kong)
Airfields	72	
Aircraft Repair Facilities	2	

Question No. 8 - Relative priority of these targets which might effect a favorable outcome of the Korean operations.

It is not believed that attack on these targets would have any immediate effect on the Korean operations, but coupled with an intensive tactical interdiction operation against bridges, roads, convoys, shipping, and trains, both in Manchuria and North Korea, a serious reduction in Communist logistics could be brought about.

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The priority, however, of these targets recommended for attack is (1) Railroad Marshalling Yards, (2) Petroleum Storage (3) Petroleum Refineries, (4) Electric Power. The mining of port approaches is a responsibility of the Navy.

Question No. 3 - Degree of effort (number of sorties including period of time involved) required to eliminate these targets and desired number of medium bombers to effect same.

In computing the forces required to destroy the recommended Chinese and Manchurian targets three methods of attack were considered. These are:

a. Under the worst conditions using night attack, with conventional bombs, considering the initial attack to be completed within a thirty-day period, there would be required approximately 162,000 tons. Restrike, which it is believed would be required every month on the marshalling yards, would require an estimated 120,000 tons monthly.

A total of 16,200 sorties of ten tons each would be required during the initial attack. This would require a force of 66 medium bomb groups equipped with 50 aircraft each.

b. Under good daylight conditions of attack with conventional bombs, considering the initial attack to be completed within a thirty-day period, there would be required approximately 9,000 tons. Monthly restrike would require approximately 7,500 tons.

Five medium bomb groups could accomplish this attack assuming 35% non-effective tonnage, however an additional target system of airfields would have to be attacked to keep attrition rates at a minimum. This could be accomplished on an austerity basis with two additional medium groups. Thus a minimum of seven medium groups would be required to accomplish daylight attacks on these target systems.

c. Using atomic bombs on these targets suitable, i.e., Marshalling Yards and Liquid Fuel plants, and conventional bombs on the other targets could be accomplished with 21 atomic bombs during the initial attack and 16 per month thereafter, with a corresponding reduction in the high explosive tonnages stated in a. and b. above.

A force of one medium bomb group (atomic) equipped with 25 aircraft could

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accomplish the atomic phase of this attack. An additional four medium bomb groups would be required for those targets which are not suitable for atomic attack.

Question No. 4 - Effect of such bombing on Strategic Air Command's Fast B-Day operations, and

* Question No. 5 - Attrition which we might expect in attacking these targets.

An analysis of attrition factors indicate that the five groups attacking the industrial targets would require 100 replacements during the first month of daylight attack and a similar number would be required each month thereafter due to attrition during contact. Additional attrition would be suffered by the two groups attacking the airfields. These attrition rates were based on the following assumptions.

a. The bomber force will be required to pass beyond the supporting range of escort aircraft prior to the bombing run for a large portion of the strike, and will therefore be exposed frequently to heavy enemy interceptor attacks.

b. Use of controlled attrition methods by Bomber Command

c. Loss rate of 7 percent per month due to enemy action

d. Loss rate of 4 percent per month due to non-combat operational conditions.

e. No retaliatory strike will be made against FEAF bases.

It is apparent from the above that considerable forces would be required to accomplish this attack. Forces required for a night attack are not available. Forces required for a daylight attack would seriously deplete the Strategic Air Command's combat potential. The initial force of seven medium bomb groups could be provided utilizing the 19th Group and six Strategic Air Command groups. Support of these units to meet attrition losses would be provided by Strategic Air Command. By applying the attrition rates presented above, it is apparent that Strategic Air Command's forces would be rapidly depleted. At this time, the USAF can provide FEAF with only three medium bombers and crews per month without adversely affecting the expansion program. Losses of approximately 100 aircraft per month would attrit Strategic Air Command's strength at the rate of over two readiness groups per month.

Reconnaissance forces to support this operation would entirely deplete Strategic Air Command's capability in this field.

Question No. 6 - Retardation, if any, by this bombing of Soviet efforts to supply materials to the Communist Chinese.

* Data provided by AFOOP. See AFOIN comment on page 7.

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It is believed that Communist Chinese vital military and civilian imports amount to approximately 8 million tons per year, 4 million tons for the civil economy, and 4 million tons for the military.

Successful attack on the recommended targets would result in an estimated 75% reduction of capacity in Manchuria's already strained rail system. This would effectively stop civilian imports and reduce military imports by one-third. These military imports include certain heavy equipment for which China is entirely dependent upon the USSR.

Question No. 6 - Relative effect by stages of the desired bombing effort on Chinese Communist operations in Korea.

It is believed that Communist Chinese stocks of most supplies and equipment within Manchuria are good. Probably no immediate effect of these attacks would be felt and it is believed that minimum military requirements will still be received unless these attacks are supplemented with an intensive tactical interdiction program within Manchuria.

There will probably be an increase in the attempted flow of supplies and equipment through Eastern Manchuria and into North East Korea and a corresponding reduction in flow through other areas in the attempt to keep supplies within the Soviet borders as long as possible while in transit.

Communist Chinese commanders' decisions may be affected due to logistic and mobility considerations.

These attacks would at least cause internal problems of such magnitude as to make it very difficult, if not impossible, for the Chinese Communist regime to undertake further aggressive expansive action. However, it is not to be expected that these attacks alone would result in an early and successful outcome of the Korean War or the early fall of the Chinese Communist regime.

Question No. 7 - Degree of effort against North Korean targets which would be obviated by such bombing of Chinese and Manchurian targets.

It is believed that the current degree of effort against North Korean targets would not be reduced due to these strategic attacks since current operations are mainly against transport targets, moreover, to gain the maximum effect from these strikes an intensified tactical operation in North Korea and Manchuria should be initiated.

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Question No. 8 - See Question No. 4 above.

Question No. 9 - Psychological effect of such bombing on the Chinese people and Government.

One of the greatest psychological strengths of the Communist Chinese is due to the belief that they have been winning. Chinese, unlike some races, are apt to side with the winner rather than become more closely united and stiffen under adverse conditions.

If the Chinese believe that the attacks are aimed at the Communist regime, and this belief could be strengthened through preattack warning in conjunction with the recommended support of the estimated 300,000 effective guerrillas, their faith in the regime would be weakened, and the inherent attraction of the side of the winner could result in a lack of confidence in the communist government and a real desire for a change.

The disruption of industry, the already heavy overloaded conditions of Chinese and Manchurian hospitals, and the possibility that the communists would not be able to cope with local revolts and the guerrilla operations would serve to further weaken the Chinese faith in the Communist regime.

Relative Importance of targets at Rashin

Question No. 1 - Approximate flow of material from the USSR to the Korean front lines through Rashin since January 1951

Question No. 2 - Resume of results in pinching off this flow by attacking communications targets South of Rashin.

The direct rail line from Rashin to Chongjin has never been completed. The indirect line that loops northwest from Rashin then back to Chongjin has several breaks and it is believed that its capacity is now down to 500 tons per day. The coastal highway from Rashin to Chongjin has been under interdiction by the Navy.

It is believed that Chongjin, and not Rashin, is the key point where railroad and highway meet, and that material and supplies from the USSR would not pass through Rashin. All food and ammunition has been coming through West Korean routes.

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Director of Intelligence, HQS/S

Lt Col Graham/ro/57486

Question No. 8 - Status of Dairen and any similar pition in Korea with respect to the USSR.

It is known from documents obtained during the United Nations occupation of North Korea that a secret military agreement exists between the Soviet Union and the North Korean regime. This agreement includes a provision for a long-term Soviet lease on the Northeast Korean ports on Chongjin (Seishin) and Najin (Rashin). Although the duration of this agreement is not certain, it is believed to be 50 years. In addition, it is considered possible that the east coast port of Wonsan (Gensan) is also included in the agreement.

AFOIN comment on AFOOP attrition data contained in answer to question no. 5:

The attrition figures used are based upon the assumptions that the targets selected for attack are vigorously protected by anti-aircraft defenses and enemy interceptor aircraft, and that the bomber force will be required to pass beyond the supporting range of escort aircraft prior to the bombing run for a large proportion of the strikes. A loss ratio similar to the one prevailing in ETO from June to December 1943 (7 per cent to every action) is assumed. The geographical factors involved are not adequately reflected in these assumptions and the enemy defensive capabilities are overrated.

a. Geographical factors. The targets recommended for attack are widely dispersed and would not involve channelized approaches. In addition, the majority of principal targets are well within 500 miles of the China coast or of UN fighter bases in Korea. Thus the assumed limitation on fighter support is unrealistic. Escort fighters could be based on or staged through held territory, Chinese Nationalist occupied islands immediately adjacent to the China coast, or on carriers.

No E/R necessary. Self-explanatory.

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b. Enemy opposition. Enemy defensive capabilities are exaggerated. While it is true that our losses at Sinuiju have been heavy, the exceptional circumstances encountered there would not prevail at the great majority of the recommended targets. The Chinese Communist Air Force alone lacks the capability effectively to defend any sizeable portion of the recommended target system. Before there could be such effective defense it would be necessary for the Soviets greatly to augment existing Chinese Communist air defenses. In the final analysis this would require the Soviet Union to draw heavily on its western air defenses.

S/ C. P. CABELL
Major General, USAF
Director of Intelligence

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